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Abstract—Disasters lead to devastating structural damage not
only to buildings and transport infrastructure, but also to other
critical infrastructure, such as the power grid and communication
backbones. Following such an event, the availability of minimal
communication services is however crucial to allow efficient and
coordinated disaster response, to enable timely public informa-
tion, or to provide individuals in need with a default mechanism
to post emergency messages. The Internet of Things consists
in the massive deployment of heterogeneous devices, most of
which battery-powered, and interconnected via wireless network
interfaces. Typical IoT communication architectures enables such
IoT devices to not only connect to the communication back-
bone (i.e. the Internet) using an infrastructure-based wireless
network paradigm, but also to communicate with one another
autonomously, without the help of any infrastructure, using a
spontaneous wireless network paradigm. In this paper, we argue
that the vast deployment of IoT-enabled devices could bring
benefits in terms of data network resilience in face of disaster.
Leveraging their spontaneous wireless networking capabilities,
IoT devices could enable minimal communication services (e.g.
emergency micro-message delivery) while the conventional com-
munication infrastructure is out of service. We identify the main
challenges that must be addressed in order to realize this potential
in practice. These challenges concern various technical aspects,
including physical connectivity requirements, network protocol
stack enhancements, data traffic prioritization schemes, as well
as social and political aspects.
Keywords—Disaster resilience, IoT, spontaneous wireless net-
working, minimal communication
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year witnesses large-scale disasters around the
world, affecting millions of people. A crucial aspect of crisis
management is distribution of information, immediately after
the disaster occurs. Usually, we rely on data communication
networks to deliver information fast, reliably, anywhere, any-
time. The Internet is today’s communication backbone, used
not only for transferring data but it is also utilized as back-
end for voice communication [1]. Even though the Internet is
a highly interconnected system with several backup paths, it
is vulnerable to the effects of large scale disasters, which can
lead to local but also global communication outages and thus
significant disruption of crisis management after such disaster
occurs.
In large scale disaster scenarios, typical approaches to
(re)establish communication abilities yield manual installation
of new hardware, which takes time. However, massive deploy-
ment of heterogeneous, Internet-enabled embedded devices is
taking place, amounting to what is called the Internet of Things
(IoT) [2]. A large part of these devices is battery powered and
communicate wirelessly. Predictions show that their number
will grow reach billions over the next decade [3], [4], and
will result in a very dense deployment which will significantly
reshape the Internet’s edge architecture, allowing for more
decentralized and dynamic communication paradigms.
In this paper, we discuss to which extent the Internet of
Things may increase network resilience in disaster scenarios.
We argue that stakeholders—in particular the general public—
would significantly benefit from leveraging the decentralized
nature of the Internet of Things, that could enable minimal
communication services in scenarios where the conventional
communication infrastructure is out of service. We analyze the
main challenges that must be addressed in order to realize this
potential. These challenges concern various technical aspects,
including physical connectivity requirements, network protocol
stack enhancements, data traffic prioritization schemes, as well
as social and political aspects, that we detail in the following.
II. CURRENT COMMUNICATION IN DISASTER SCENARIOS
Communication in disaster scenarios is primarily driven by
exchanging important instead of arbitrary information. Differ-
ent groups of actors have different communication require-
ments, which finally lead to the deployment of the underlying
technology.
A. Communication requirements
A disaster may disconnect a complete country from the
rest of the world or limit capacities to data with very low
throughput. Ideally this remaining connectivity should be
used by the most important services and actors, mainly for
information-sharing and coordination. With passing time after
a disaster happened these priorities are further subject to
change. In the period of time following the initial impact
the actual saving of human life is the most important action
that needs to be coordinated. This is generally done between
first responders such as fire-fighters, police, and technical
response forces. For disaster with devastating impacts the
prioritization of communication capabilities will shift after
the initial time period towards governmental organizations
and non-governmental organizations that are concerned with
providing foot and shelter and restoring the social systems.
During all phases there is further need of communication
for the general public. The population in the affected areas has
to be warned of threats and to be informed of retreat routes
and similar information. People need further to communicate
with relatives and other persons inside as well as outside the
disaster area to check on their status [5].
The actors that operate in disaster areas and their used
communication mechanisms can be categorized as follow.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of delay and throughput requirements of typical
applications in disaster scenarios.
First responders: Communication between teams using
voice and text connections.
Governmental organizations: Communication between cen-
tral situation centers using voice, text and further access
to databases.
Non-governmental organizations: Coordination using voice
and text communication, access to logistical databases.
The press: Sending texts out of the disaster area, audio and
video broadcasts.
The general public: Emergency calls, status calls, receive
news and situational updates, receive environmen-
tal/emergency warnings.
We compare the communication services in a three dimen-
sional space with respect to basic communication parameters,
needed throughput, the direction in which the data flows, and
finally the requirements on timing constraints (cf., Figure 1).
It is worth noting that the distinction between the actors is
not exclusive. In particular, the general public covers multiple
fields. With the advent of blogging, social networks, and
micro messaging (e.g., Twitter) citizen journalism has been
established to complement the press by public contributions.
After the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, for example, ≈ 50 %
of the photos related to the disaster in the Tokyo area have
been uploaded to Flickr in less than 24 hours. This information
fulfills two purposes, it informs other people about the current
state but also helps rescue teams to identify relevant areas.
Previous disasters also shown that first responders are not
only experts but also volunteers from the neighborhood, who
help [5]. These observations have direct implications on the
devices, which are used on-site, and thus on the deployed
technology. Professionals such as press, NGOs, and first
responders may own special hardware. The general public
is equipped with mass market devices (e.g., smartphones)
providing basic communication functionality. Building a more
robust communication infrastructure should consider this and
incorporate public devices.
The distance between two communication partners, which
needs to be bridged, is diverse even within a group of stake-
holders. Typical NGO scenarios illustrate this nicely. Field
workers require short range communication between peers, as
well as long range communication to request external data
and to interact with external operation control center. Short
range communication is limited to a smaller geographic area,
in which long range communication bridges further distances.
The latter is currently implemented in the Internet.
B. Dependency on fixed infrastructure
Today’s communication is heavily based on the Internet.
Originally, different infrastructures have been operated for
voice and data traffic. This distinction continuously converges
towards a unified backbone implemented by the Internet [1].
The Internet provides packet-based data delivery and allows
for a wide range of communication services on top of the
delivery infrastructure, making it more attractive compared to
other backbones.
Successful communication in disaster scenarios is tied
to the successful operation of the Internet. This relates to
two perspectives, the outsider and the insider perspective. A
disaster that affects Internet infrastructure components may
also affect people living in areas which are geographically
outside of the disaster region. During the localized 9/11 attack
smaller Internet outages have been experienced in Japan, for
example. Given that the Internet is the backbone of our daily
communication this can lead to severe problems. People inside
the disaster area rely on the Internet (or Internet technologies)
to exchange information.
The proper operation of the basic Internet infrastructure
depends on wired connections and fixed power supplies.
Both components make the Internet vulnerable to breakdown
caused by disasters. Large scale disasters by definition have
in common that wide areas of land are affected by immense
forces such as floods, storms, or earthquakes. These forces lead
usually to an immense destruction of man-made infrastructure,
which is also important for the Internet backbone. Build-
ings accommodating points of presence collapse (e.g., 9/11),
oversea cables break (e.g., Japan earthquake 2011), or power
supplies turn down (e.g., Italy blackout 2003), for example.
Satellite Internet access replaces cables in specific regions but
those equipment still represent rather fix component.
For Internet hardware, it can be distinguished between two
basic classes of fault modes that leave the infrastructure in a
non-working state: Systems can suffer recoverable fault or they
can suffer permanent damage. For the first class typical fault
modes are power outages and overload conditions. As soon
as power is restored or overload conditions are resolved, the
system can continue in normal operation and little intervention
by the network operators is required. Typical types for the
second class of fault modes are broken wires and physically
damaged hardware. In both cases massive repair effort by
technical personal is required, as hardware needs to be replaced
or connections have to be rewired. In case of highly destructive
disasters these fault modes are more common. During most
disasters buildings and power grids collapse, and the repairs
requires significant time. Both fault classes are in fact not
independent of each other. The outage of a backbone router
will lead to a redirection of traffic which can lead to an
overload condition and subsequent failure of another router.
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Fig. 2. Usage of available throughput between two directly connected peers by typical applications for different access technologies.
The 2003 Italy blackout demonstrated the consequences of
long-range, cascading failures and the interplay between the
Internet and the fix power grid. A storm caused cascading
outage of several power stations, which caused a failure of the
Internet infrastructure, finally leading to additional breakdowns
of power stations.
A fast recovery of communication infrastructure is of ut-
most importance. The common approaches today are to set-up
temporary connectivity using mobile 3G/GSM base stations,
satellite up-links, and improvised wiring paired with mobile
generators for power supply. All these techniques though have
in common that considerable time is needed to set them up.
Depending on the location of the disaster, the (heavy) equip-
ment needs to be transported, deployed, and initialized. For
the time this takes the connectivity in the disaster area is very
limited with respect to reachability and capacity. Furthermore,
in the meantime privately installed wireless infrastructure may
conflict with regained communication networks. The Haiti
earthquake 2010 strikingly illustrated this when local ISPs
restored 90 % of the network using wireless technology but
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) accidentally broke
network communication by taking over the wireless spectrum.
C. Towards a disaster-adaptive communication infrastructure
Without doubt the Internet is very fundamental to enable
communication—before, during, and after a disaster happened.
Even though the Internet is a highly connected infrastructure
providing high redundancy, its resilience is currently limited
due to very basic dependency on fixed infrastructure compo-
nents. Evolving the Internet to a completely disaster agnostic
infrastructure with full service capabilities is a rather unrealis-
tic challenge even when applying future Internet technologies.
However, narrowing the scope to minimal communication
reduces complexity and complies with the principle needs in
disaster scenarios.
To overcome the major dependency on fixed components,
communication networks are complemented by wireless trans-
mission and battery power. The Internet of Things (IoT) inher-
ently implements this perspective. On the downside, wireless
technology and low energy result in constrained throughput.
For typical IoT access technologies Figure 2 clearly indicates
that still a reasonable amount of messages and calls can be
exchanged between two parties. Building a disaster resilient
communication network which provides these communication
abilities in a stable deployment but with the flexibility of the
Internet improves the current state of art.
III. RESILIENCE POTENTIAL OF THE INTERNET OF
THINGS
The number of devices connected to the Internet has seen
a steady growth since its creation. In the 90s, this growth was
fueled by the advent of the hypertext transport protocol and
the web. In the 2000s, this growth was driven by the new
availability of wired broadband Internet access which enabled
other popular applications such as multimedia streaming. Over
the last decade, the growth has been driven by the emergence
of wireless broadband Internet access via cellphones, laptops,
tablets, and by novel, ultra-connected applications such as
social networks. It is now projected that the growth will
be fueled by the Internet of Things (IoT), i.e. the massive
deployment of heterogeneous, communicating devices [3], [4],
ranging from wireless sensors to smart home appliances, which
will blend in the global network, challenging the traditional
notions of ’Internet host’ and ’router’.
A significant part of the IoT thus consists in billions
of battery powered devices that can communicate wirelessly,
deployed in every location where humans shape their en-
vironment. In fact, most IoT devices use a communication
architecture that is fundamentally richer that the conven-
tional, infrastructure-based communication architecture em-
ployed to date. By leveraging a spontaneous wireless net-
working paradigm [6], such IoT devices are natively able to
both (i) communicate via access points of the infrastructure
if they are available, and (ii) communicate with one another
autonomously, without the infrastructure as intermediary, if
the latter is not available. Spontaneous wireless networking
provides the necessary automatic mechanisms so that IoT
devices can dynamically self-organize the relaying of data
towards destination [7]. In that sense, each such IoT device
is by default both host and router.
Thus, when one considers the IoT as a dense collection of
battery-powered devices using a spontaneous wireless network
paradigm, it becomes apparent that this architecture is naturally
more resilient in face of disasters, and is less prone to the
impacts described in section II-B. By running on battery power,
nodes are not affected by power black-outs and damaged
power cables. By using radio links the communication between
devices does not suffer from broken wiring. Furthermore, by
leveraging its dense deployment, and its ability to sponta-
neously self-organize wireless multi hop communication, the
IoT brings a huge additional advantage: it comes with built-in
redundancy. This means that even with a large loss of nodes,
there is a good chance that the network will still consist in a
giant component of physically connected nodes, which could
be put to use immediately after the disaster happens.
It is however projected that IoT devices will be very diverse
with respect to characteristics including computation power,
memory capacity and communication capabilities. While to-
day’s cell-phones are able to transmit and receive data using
Wifi, Bluetooth, UMTS or LTE with throughputs ranging from
a few Mbit/s to a few hundred Mbit/s, typical wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) use radio standards that provide significantly
lower throughput, in the range of a few hundred kbit/s [8].
In order to ensure connectivity over large areas, it is safe to
assume that any IoT device that has survived the disaster in
the area may be used as potential relay. Since the available
throughput is smaller than the bottleneck on the path, it may
thus be that a particularly constrained IoT device severely
limits the available throughput towards a given destination.
Furthermore, the routing mechanisms at work in large scale
spontaneous wireless network may limit this throughput even
more [?]. However, in any disaster scenario, a good rule of
thumb is: limited connectivity is better than no connectivity at
all. When looking at the communication requirements listed
in section II, it becomes apparent that even a low through-
put, text-based emergency service would help improving the
coordination, speed and efficiency of disaster response, and
that the availability of such a service may save lives as a
direct consequence. Such mechanisms could enable diverse
services including (i) emergency broadcast to all devices in
an area to warn the general public, (ii) first-responder text-
based situation reports communication to central coordination
instances which can then make faster and more informed
decisions, or (iii) individuals may emit emergency messages
which allow response forces to detect and locate them in
scenarios where some people are buried for instance.
It is furthermore noteworthy that a substantial part of
the IoT is expected to consist in sensors that monitor vari-
ous environmental parameters, thus providing quasi-ubiquitous
sensing capabilities. Using these capabilities, coupled with the
resilience of the IoT may provide crucial real-time data about
disaster areas, which can help decision makers to better un-
derstand the impact of a disaster and react more appropriately.
Available sensor data may range from temperature readings
during bush fires, radiation readings after nuclear accidents or
even destruction estimates based on the number and location
of nodes that become unreachable.
IV. OPEN CHALLENGES
The IoT has considerable potential to contribute signif-
icantly to disaster resilience of communication networks as
we discussed in Section III. However, prior to succeeding in
the ‘grand challenges’, the IoT is challenged by a variety of
open questions and unsolved problems. Most challenges do
not arise from the lack of existing technologies, but rather
from a premature development of existing technologies and in
particular from a lack of common standards and deployments
that seamlessly interconnect. In the following section we will
point out the areas where the most pressing issues arise.
A. Physical connectivity and hardware limitations
Physical connectivity on a hardware level is the essential
foundation to enable communication between devices. Sharing
the same PHY and link layer is a requirement for data
exchange between neighboring devices. For the IoT this means
the use of common interface cards that use the same radio
frequencies, modulations, link layer technology etc. Multiply
connected gateways are required for transitioning network
technologies.
A large heterogeneity of network access technologies,
though, not only increases complexity of inter-networking, but
may also lead to severe deployment problems in the wireless
domain. Various radios that consume interfering frequencies
of the limited spectrum by incompatible technologies may
harm communication capacities at large without an ability to
mutually coordinate.
Mobile phones broadly use 3GPP standards for data com-
munication, such as UMTS, and increasingly LTE. In addition,
modern phones and other handheld devices (e.g., tablets)
have further network interfaces such as IEEE 802.11 (Wifi)
and IEEE 802.15.1 (Bluetooth). They are thus widespread
candidates for bridging between radio technologies and serving
as gateways. Similarly, millions of Wifi access points are
deployed, each of which typically featuring a wireless and a
wired network interface card for offering transit from small
wireless ’cells’ to the remaining Internet. Energy constraints
typically restrict wireless sensors to a single wireless interface,
either using a link layer based on IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE), which is not backward compatible. Other
gateways like IEEE 802.15.4 border routers or Bluetooth 4.0
dual-mode devices need to be in place to integrate IoT devices.
In disaster scenarios, all available devices should form a
single, largely connected network—as redundant as possible.
Assuming the infrastructure is down (e.g., because of power
blackout or cable damage), some battery-powered devices with
multiple interfaces using different radio technologies such as
smartphones, tablets, laptops will have to play the role of
border routers to enable physical connectivity. However, it
is noteworthy that these consumer devices typically neither
have a IEEE 802.15.4 nor a BLE interface, which may lead to
network partitioning because sensor networks using this link
layer technology are unable to interconnect at the physical
layer.
Moreover, since 30 years the industry has focused quasi
exclusively on improving infrastructure-based wireless link
layer technologies. It has largely ignored spontaneous wireless
networking to the point that even today—15 years after the
initial 802.11 standards were published—standard Wifi ad hoc
mode is often not interoperable among vendors, if implemented
at all. More generally, it remains to be seen how far new tech-
nologies can improve the performance of ad hoc, spontaneous
wireless communication.
B. Logical network connectivity
The aim and outstanding success of today’s Internet builds
on its efficient and seamless way of interconnecting networks
that use heterogeneous link layer technologies. This was
achieved at large scale by using IP (the Internet Protocol) as
the unique networking protocol and TCP/UDP at the transport
layer. Wireless sensors and other constrained wireless devices
are however too often based on proprietary network stacks
(e.g., Zigbee or Nordic’s Speedburst) that cannot interoperate
across link layers or network borders. These confined network-
ing solutions typically rely on specialized gateways to connect
devices with the IP-based networks (i.e., the Internet).
Recently, the situation has improved, though, as the IETF
has published relevant standards for the IoT. 6LoWPAN de-
fines a lightweight network sublayer that enables constrained
nodes (e.g., wireless sensors using IEEE 802.15.4) to interop-
erate natively with IPv6. 6LoWPAN thus enables a substantial
fraction of IoT devices to connect directly to the Internet. It
is projected that in the near future, proprietary network stacks
will be phased out in favor of an IPv6 network stack using
6LoWPAN, as this brings not only benefits for vendors through
standardization but also through faster time-to-market, cheaper
development cycles leveraging well-known development prac-
tices and tools.
However, 6LoWPAN as a minimal standard of speaking
IPv6 among devices is insufficient to orchestrate large scale
spontaneous wireless networking, as required for disaster re-
silience described in Section III. Improved disaster resilience
relies on the ability of IoT devices to (i) dynamically recon-
figure forwarding tables in order to route data over multiple
wireless hops, towards destination, and (ii) dynamically adapt
transport layer mechanisms to the particular versatility of
multi-hop wireless communication. Both (i) and (ii) should be
achieved automatically, without explicit configuration, without
the need of intervention from users and network administrators,
and without the help of infrastructure. Over the last decade,
a significant amount of work has been accomplished in this
field, which resulted in the publications of new routing protocol
standards (e.g., RPL, OLSR) to cope with (i). More work is
however needed to achieve better scalability of routing protocol
overhead in practice—we are still far from the theoretical
bounds. Furthermore, TCP modifications are desirable to ef-
ficiently accommodate multi-hop wireless communication to
cope with (ii).
Additional auto configuration mechanisms are needed for
IoT devices to be useful in case of disaster which results in
unavailability of infrastructure-based networks. For instance,
sensor networks and other IoT networks are mostly envisioned
as stub networks which connect to the Internet through a given
gateway. This gateway directly or indirectly determines the
configuration of attached nodes, including parameters such
as IP address, encryption details. Unless nodes reconfigure
automatically these parameters upon detection of infrastructure
unreachability, nodes that were in separate stub networks
prior to the disaster may not be able to communicate with
one another because the network layer will prohibit it—thus
annihilating the chances of spontaneously interconnecting to
form a single, large network spanning the disaster area. To
efficiently enable this behavior, future work has to be carried
out.
C. Prioritization of data traffic
Largely heterogeneous link transitions bear the problem
of exhausting congestions that are likely to kill data flows.
Assuming the connectivity gap is bridged at the MAC/PHY
layer and at the network layer as described in Sections IV-A
and IV-B, throughput may be very limited. The general idea is
to use the available throughput for the most important services,
as described in Section II. A challenge that remains is thus the
design of mechanisms that guarantees that only these services
do use of the available throughput.
An idea could be to introduce a ’disaster mode’ for IoT
devices. Besides their normal mode of operation, IoT nodes
could switch to an alternative mode of operation in which the
goal becomes spontaneous maximization of connectivity in the
sense described in Section III. Furthermore, this special mode
of operation could implement prioritization policies that would
guarantee first responders or official organizations privileged
access to the newly spawned communication network. This
’disaster mode’ would be roughly comparable to the emergency
call mode in today’s mobile phones, where 911 calls are
possible even if no registered SIM-card is activated.
In fact, such a mode of operation may be necessary anyway
in case of disaster because, should massively deployed sensors
and smart object resume their ’normal operation’ automatically
after the disaster, the limited throughput left available may be
involuntarily clogged by ’unimportant’ data traffic – a case
that should be avoided. Note that this may also apply to other
types of data traffic, e.g., system updates on smart-phones.
As promising as such an approach sounds, there are
however important additional technical questions, as well as
political questions, which have to be investigated. How/when
exactly would such a ’disaster mode’ be triggered? What kind
of regulations are needed to force vendors to integrate this
mode into their devices? How should such a ’disaster mode’
be standardized?
D. Social acceptance
As described in Section III, leveraging IoT devices to
mitigate the impact of a disaster on network connectivity
implies that devices may be required to be operated outside
their intended scope, and connect to external parties that
normally do not have access to those devices. For example,
if privately owned sensor networks were required to relay
communication traffic on behalf of governmental agencies, or
on behalf of other private individuals that must send/receive
emergency information, the owners of such networks would
need to allow a mode of operation that they do not fully
control. Social acceptance of this category of usage should be
studied, to prevent situations where owners of devices actively
try to block any use outside their full control—preventing in
effect the approach towards more resilience.
E. Network security aspects
The IoT in general presents a number of challenges in
terms of application layer and network layer security. These
security challenges naturally transfer to IoT use in case of
disaster scenarios. In this context, one should avoid the usual
reflex of initially leaving security aspects out of the picture
because ”every bit of the scarce throughput should be used
for communication traffic”. For example, there are a number
of scenarios in which unprotected network traffic could be
used by malicious third parties to intentionally interrupt or
alter information that is exchanged between first responders or
coming from emergency calls, e.g., large-scale terrorist attacks
such as 9/11. As data is routed through the IoT, attackers could
try to tamper with communications ways that cripple helper
organization. Furthermore, the mechanisms that trigger devices
to switch to ’disaster mode’ operation should itself be secure
in order to prevent attacks aiming to disrupt normal network
operation. These challenges are directly related to lightweight,
decentralized authentication schemes.
F. Towards disaster resilience
With the technology available today, the Internet of Things
cannot yet be used to improve our communication networks
resilience in face of large-scale disasters. Several challenges
must be addressed beforehand. While from a technical per-
spective the open questions we have identified yield substantial
issues to be solved there are no fundamental show-stopper to
allow the IoT to mitigate the impact of a disaster on network
connectivity. The main question is thus not whether the IoT
can be leveraged to improve disaster resilience, but rather to
which extent and how it should be adopted.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Internet of Things is already here. Beyond traditional
routers and Internet hosts such as PCs or smartphones/tablets,
a new category of battery-powered, connected machines has
emerged, and applications using these machines are announced
and brought to the market on a daily basis. Projections indicate
that massive deployment of such devices is dawning, and will
soon revolutionize the edge architecture of the Internet, by
leveraging not only infrastructure-based wireless networking
but also spontaneous wireless networking. This enriched ar-
chitecture can significantly improve the resilience of basic
data communication services in face of disasters that damage
conventional communication network infrastructure.
While the IoT is not able to provide the full range of com-
munication services expected from pre-disaster Internet, one
can nevertheless envision providing better-than-nothing ser-
vices such as emergency micro-messaging, using IoT devices
as relays and popular handheld devices (e.g. smartphones)
as user terminals. This paper proposed an overview of this
vision, and highlighted the major advantage such an approach
could bring: the automatic reconfiguration of the network to
interconnect surviving devices immediately after the disaster,
even if the infrastructure is down and the power grid is out.
Basic connectivity and simple text-based data communication
could then remain available during the crucial gap between
the time when the disaster occurs and the time when qualified
manpower reach the area and set up dedicated hardware putting
conventional communication infrastructure back in service.
There are however a number of challenges that need to
be addressed before this vision can be realized. This paper
provided an analysis of the different categories of issues that
lie ahead. These concern on one hand technical aspects such
as physical connectivity requirements, network protocol stack
enhancements, or data traffic prioritization schemes, and on the
other hand non-technical aspects such as social and political
considerations. We argue that while the relevant technical
issues are substantial, there are no identified show-stoppers.
Concerning non-technical aspects, we argue that legislating
on the matter would probably be necessary. We propose the
definition of a mandatory ’disaster mode’ of operation for
IoT devices (similar to cellphone’s 911 mode of operation),
which could automatically kick in to reconfigure the surviving
network elements in cases where infrastructure is out of
service, enabling automatically basic connectivity and simple
text-based data communication for emergency purposes.
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